Background
In 1641, after the outbreak of the Portuguese Restoration War, the Portuguese government, with Dutch and French help, prepared to start the offensive against Spain at sea. From the Dutch side, the Dutch States-General decided to send a fleet of 20 ships. Five admirals proved incapable, beyond their normal obligations, to supply these ships. They were still feeling the effects of the tremendous effort of 1639, the year of the Battle of Duins. In the end it was decided to hire suitable merchant ships and go to war. That also took effort, partly because several “big sturdy ships” had been sold to the enemy – Spain! As for the crew, the admirals were unwilling to increase their number of naval officers in permanent service. Therefore, temporary military service had to suffice hiring merchant mariners and captains of the East and West Indies Companies.
Artus Gijsels, was asked to lead the force. Gijsels, had made a career with the V.O.C. as Vice Admiral and later became an official of the W.I.C. Jacob Pieterszoon Tolck, a captain of the Noorderkwartier, was made Rear Admiral. The admiralty lords of Zeeland insisted, that one of their captains also should take the place or Rear Admiral. They sent De Ruyter to the States-General with a missive (letter of office) recommending him to admiral Gijsels. Gijsels had no objections, however The States-General did not wish to comply with the demand of the Zeeuwen. In the end, the Stadtholder intervened and appointed De Ruyter on his behalf to Rear Admiral. And so could the 34-year-old, former rope maker boy from Vlissingen hoists his flag as Rear Admiral in the ship “De Haze”, of 360 tons, one of the weakest bottoms of the fleet, which was equipped for the occasion with 26 guns and a total of 90 “sailors and soldiers”. In July, “De Haze” left from Vlissingen to the Dutch coast to join the fleet. On August 12, they left to arrive on September 10 in Lisbon.
From the Portuguese side. Dom António Telles da Silva, who had fought the Dutch in India, was designated commander of a squadron of 16 ships, which along with those of the Dutch was entrusted with the mission to capture and hold the Spanish towns of Cádiz and Sanlúcar. The attempts failed thanks to the fortuitous encounter that they had with 5 Dunkirkers under Judocus Peeters, who was chasing a flotilla of Algerian privateers, off Cape St. Vincent. Peeters managed to reach Cádiz without losing a single vessel and put on alert the Marquis of Ayamonte and Don Gaspar Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán, 9th Duke of Medina Sidonia.
Gijsels and Telles returned to Lisbon, where Telles was replaced by Tristão de Mendonça, former Ambassador to the Dutch Republic. The Portuguese fleet then sailed with the French fleet of the Marquis de Brézé,while the Dutch fleet set sail in order to intercept and capture the Spanish West Indies Fleet between the Azores and Cape St. Vincent. It was a hasty manoeuvre, since the Dutch ships had orders to return to their country if the West Indies Fleet didn’t appear before November.
Battle
The Spanish squadron of Galicia, under Don Andrés de Castro, the squadron of Naples, under Don Martín Carlos de Meneos, and the galleons of Don Pedro de Ursúa, were urgently gathered in Cádiz to intercept the Dutch fleet and to bring in the Silver Fleet. The military governor of Cádiz, Don Juan Alonso de Idiáquez y Robles, Duke of Ciudad Real, was appointed commander of the fleet in substitution of the Captain General, the Duke of Maqueda, who was ill. He was a veteran soldier, having seen action in the Siege of Leucata against the French, but was inexperienced in sea battles.
Gijsels fleet was sighted off Cape St. Vincent on 4 November. The Duke of Ciudad Real immediately ordered to attack the major Dutch vessels. The Spanish fleet was larger in number and more heavily manned than that of the Dutch. A squadron of Dunkirkers was part of it.
At the start of the battle, the Dutch fleet was not sailing in the predetermined “zeylordre”. Vice-Admiral Tolck remained some distance behind “buyten den roock” instead of in the vanguard where he should have been. De Ruyter formed the middle section, the place where the commander normally sails with his squadron, Gijsels’ squadron formed the vanguard.
In the early afternoon two ships threatened to be cut off from the rear. Several Spaniards and Dunkirks boarded those ships, the Engel Gabriel and De Swaen. When De Ruyter saw this, he turned towards it and tried to relieve them. During that manoeuvre, however, he received so many shots under water that he first had to “creeng”, to stop the holes. Here de Ruyter showed what he would do repeatedly later many times; ‘giving priority to helping friends in need over fighting enemies’. This is perhaps the only mild criticism of the admiral, that in him the human being, and especially the sailor, sometimes won out over the soldier. Much later, during the First Battle of Schooneveld in June 1673, he would come to the aid of Cornelis Tromp instead of pursuing several cut-off English ships. In the meantime, the Haze was repeatedly leaked so that the water even started to enter the powder room. Only with continuous pumping was it possible to keep the powder dry. In the end he still managed to relieve De Swaen. The Angel Gabriel had meanwhile sunk. And just when he was about to board an already badly damaged Dunkirk, De Swaen started waving to get his attention. This ship was also in danger of sinking. De Ruyter now let go of the Dunkirk and put out a boat and managed to save a dozen men just in time from the keel of the now capsized Swaen.
After the battle
After suffering severe casualties, the Spanish stopped the attack, and the ships were ordered to fall back to Cádiz. This conduct dissatisfied King Philip IV, who severely reprimanded, among other officers, Don Martín Carlos de Mencos, Admiral Don Pedro de Ursúa, and Captains Pedro Girón, Gaspar de Campos, and Adrián Pulido.
After the battle it turned out that De Ruyter’s ship had 18 shots in the hull, to same as De Pelicaen, also from his squadron. These holes were as many as the rest of the fleet combined! To get to the most dangerous leak, everything that stood in the way had to be hacked away. Then it was seen that the hole was 2 by 2½ feet in size, so that, wrote De Ruyter, if they had had not been able to get to the hole by force, the ship would have had to sink, even if they had had 20 pumps.
The admiral hoisted the white pitshaers flag to convene the broad council of war. It was decided that De Ruyter would sail ahead to the Tagus, as De Haze still threatened to sink under his feet. The rest of the fleet would follow him. In the meantime, a furious southeaster storm was blowing up. With great seamanship, De Ruyter succeeded in bringing his heavily holed bottom into the Tagus, while the rest of the fleet would arrive a few days later. They remained in Lisbon until January 11. In those two months, discipline in the fleet deteriorated visibly. More than 50 men deserted. Many times, it was necessary to intervene to restore order on the ships. However, no irregularities on board De Haze. The journey home in the winter months was not a pleasure trip either. Severe storms and thunderstorms in the Channel scattered the fleet. On De Haze, they had to pump for the full ten days to keep the ship above water. On January 20, De Ruyter came to the ‘rede’ of Vlissingen. Admiral Gijsels came first for Hellevoetsluis on the 22nd.
The start of De Ruyter’s career in the service of his country
This expedition, the first real naval experience for the young De Ruyter, added nothing to Dutch maritime glory. But it did show what De Ruyter had in him. Admiral Gijsels had little good to say about the equipment and personnel made available to him. However, unlike Tolck, he had nothing but praise for his Rear Admiral. Nevertheless, this was “once but never again” for De Ruyter. Off course we know better.
De Ruyter went to merchant service with the shipping company of the Lampsins brothers, but this time for the first time as Skipper/(co-)owner on the 400-tonne ship De Salamander with 50 men. During the battle, De Ruyter made the weighty decision to independently carry out a manoeuvre in which he broke the connection with his admiral. About 150 years later, Nelson would also do the same against the Spaniards in the same area in a naval battle. Nelson showed brilliant tactical insight, his manoeuvre then contributed decisively to the victory. Whether that was also the case in De Ruyter’s case remains to be seen. De Ruyter was not primarily motivated by the urge to defeat the enemy, although that was what he fought for, but to relieve his fellow skippers. The fact that de Ruyter, as naval master, had great tactical insight can be seen in naval battles such as the Four Days Battle and especially the masterly retreat across the banks after the lost Two Days Battle. But in this case the sailor in the still young ex-merchant vessel may have won from the soldier. Professor Boxer, the well-known English historian, who studied De Ruyter intensively and, as an admiral, eventually rated him higher than Nelson, believed the manoeuvre was also of essential tactical importance.